David Welborn's discerning examination of the ways in which President Johnson conducted his "business in regulation" sheds much needed empirical light upon the translation of presidential power into regulatory behavior, from the public image projected by a board or bickering commissioners, to the substantive details of international airline routes and residual oil controls. Welborn's analysis provides a crisp picture of one president's perceptions of his regulatory responsibilities and the context within which he operated, defined (somewhat oddly) by time constraints, political necessity, an ambitious political agenda, and a hefty respect for the autonomy and competency of the independent regulatory commissions. Yet Welborn's concentrated effort to study regulation in the White House yields insights into the institutional powers of the presidency that extend beyond the business of regulation, and that illustrate a president's understanding of the public interest, his mandate to serve, and the implications for exercising presidential authority.
Welborn's study builds from a simple premise: The president has inescapable regulatory responsibilities related to his role as chief executive, as a leader with a legislative agenda, and as the designated authority for deciding particular substantive regulatory matters. Welborn asks, in exercising these various responsibilities, "what do presidents actually do and how do they go about doing it?". He argues that the business of regulation in the Johnson White House was motivated by three objectives: 1) to prevent harm that regulatory activities might bring to the administration; 2) to "enlist regulatory assistance" to facilitate the administration's "basic economic policy objectives," and 3) to pursue "consumer, health, safety, and environmental protection" by expanding social regulation. These objectives were pursued in a manner that "confounds the conventional wisdom about presidents and regulation and also about Johnson the president. Welborn documents a White House actively involved in managing its regulatory business at a variety of levels, influential in its ability to affect regulatory outcomes, and a president whose depth of substantive and political knowledge of regulatory affairs provided ample means to facilitate a broader political agenda. Regulatory business, in other words, was not an end in itself for Johnson, but a means to broader ends.
Following an introduction providing an overview of the institutional and political constraints affecting presidential management of the regulatory process, and a profile of LBJ's leadership style, the book probes Johnson's regulatory role in three contexts. Chapters 2 and 3 focus upon the independent commissions. An examination of Johnson's strategic use of the appointment process, and the "linkages" between the White House and the commissions on a day-to-day basis provides a convincing argument for the "balance" Johnson tried to achieve "between agency and presidential business," and between an activist White House seeking cooperation and teamwork with the commissions, and the need to respect commission autonomy. Regulatory activity within the executive branch is examined in chapters 4 and 5. In contrast to Johnson's "arms length" rule in dealing with the substantive agendas of the commissions, the White House played an integral role in the regulation of oil imports through the Department of Interior, commodity prices through Agriculture, and the coordination of banking supervision through Treasury. Further, these regulatory leaders readily assumed the roles of "advocates," in contrast to the expectations for commissioners. The direct links between these areas of regulation and economic performance (particularly the effort to hold down inflation), brought the White House into the substantive details. In matters of antitrust (chapter 5), however, the ties between the White House and the Justice Department, as well as the perceived connection between antitrust policy and economic performance, were more "tenuous." Chapter 6 examines the administration's legislative agenda, particularly the ambitious expansion of social regulation. The final chapter categorizes Johnson's regulatory involvement across the three contexts as "high," "moderate," or "low," and examines the presence of three factors in individual cases that tended to draw Johnson into regulatory issues: "duty, compulsion, and disagreement". When the president had a de jure or de facto "obligation to act," a compulsion to act for furthering his (political) interests, and there was disagreement between the White House staff and an agency, for example, Welborn argues there was a likelihood of high presidential involvement in the issue.
Welborn's use of the memoranda and working papers of the Johnson White House provides direct links between presidential priorities, the use of presidential influence, and (often) the shift in regulatory behavior--at times substantive, at times stylistic. Yet it is precisely his very detailed empirical work that would lend itself to a much richer and more generalized analysis of the institution of the presidency as an influence upon regulatory activities, in particular, but the administration of the executive branch, more generally. This reviewer was hoping for a more systematic return to questions raised early in the book about presidential influence over regulatory behavior, versus that of regulated interests and the Congress. What does the Johnson experience tell us about the limits of presidential influence, and are those limits personal (related to style and agenda) or institutional? If the authority is there to be exercised, what determines its restrained use? The complicated debate over "who controls the bureaucracy" (long fought on the field of formal models) could be enriched by an analysis such as Welborn's that demonstrates the exercise of influence as well as its limitations. Further, how does Johnson's approach to the business of regulation contrast or parallel the approaches of more recent presidents, particularly Reagan? Was Johnson's use of the BOB, and his formula for regulatory appointments a precursor to the more centralized and systematic approach to regulation taken by later presidents? A second, minor criticism is Welborn's hesitancy to elaborate upon Johnson's governing style, such as his willingness to buck the demands of "special" interests in the attempt to facilitate fairness. We often argue that presidents are motivated by their more broadly based political coalitions in their conduct of executive branch business (in contrast to the parochial concerns of Congress), but a systematic investigation of their actions in trying to serve that broader interest (particularly when confronted by powerful, more particular interests) is scarce. Welborn provides some insights, although without elaboration.
This discussion about the potential for extending Welborn's analysis should not take away from his important contribution to the study of regulation and his vivid presentation of the very personal and political management of regulatory affairs that is possible from the White House. The book is thorough in its coverage, consequential in its findings, enlivened by its empirical base (in part, the quotes and commands of LBJ on regulation), and a must-read read for anyone interested not only in the business of regulation, but in the institution of the presidency as a tool for managing, directing, and influencing bureaucratic behavior.
ANNE M. KHADEMIAN University of Wisconsin, Madison
Thomson Gale Document Number:A16531130